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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE FOOD CHAIN LOOKING UP:
SUBCONTRACTORS ARE FINDING THAT ADDITIONAL INSURED
ENDORSEMENTS ARE GIVING THEM MUCH MORE THAN THEY
BARGAINED FOR

I. INTRODUCTION
Exploding dynamite, collapsing scaffolds, falling debris . . . construction
projects have always been fraught with the possibility of significant risks.
Surely no one has thought, however, to add additional insured endorsements to
the list of potential risks. Yet, given the courts’ recent interpretation of these
endorsements, adding any entity as an additional insured on your insurance
policy carries with it a huge risk.
The term “additional insured” refers to an entity that has been added to
another entity’s insurance policy.1 This former entity then has the benefit of
direct rights on the insurance policy and enjoys the same coverage as the
purchaser of the policy (the named insured), while enjoying no responsibility
to pay any premiums or deductibles. This arrangement has recently become
quite typical in construction contracts, with the general contractor requiring his
subcontractor to include him as an additional insured on the subcontractor’s
insurance policy. This is done for a variety of reasons, but overall, general
contractors have found it to be an extremely effective method to shift risk away
from themselves in both construction defect and injury claims. From the
general contractor’s standpoint, this is a wonderful arrangement. However, it
seems that very few have thought to look at this from the subcontractor’s point
of view.2 The modern trend has been to read these endorsements extremely
broadly; thus, only the slightest suggestion that a subcontractor has some fault
can force that subcontractor’s insurance to pick up the defense of multiple
parties. On its face, this does not sound so horrible: is this not what insurance
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 811 (7th ed. 1999).
2. Many articles focus on the wonderful benefits general contractors can derive from this
relationship and fail to mention the detrimental effects this has on the subcontractors whose
insurance is called on to defend. See, e.g., Dennis M. Cusack, A Broad View: The Additional
Insured Endorsement’s Scope, LA DAILY J., Sept. 12, 1996, at 7; Dennis Rolstad & Jordan
Stanzler, Critical Coverage, Insurance Law: Additional Insured Endorsements are a Valuable
Source of Protection for Contractors and Project Owners, LA DAILY J., Jan. 12, 2001, at S2;
Scott S. Thomas, The Endorsers: Aggressively Pursuing Rights Under an Additional Insured
Endorsement Can Provide Broad Construction Defect Insurance Coverage in the Event of a
Claim, LA DAILY J., Aug. 13, 1999, at S8.
697
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is for? That is what the courts seem to be saying in their opinions. The
problem is that courts do not even consider the impact on the named insured
(the subcontractor) when his policy is called on to defend. Every time his
insurance becomes involved to defend or pay a judgment, the subcontractor
must pay his deductible and further faces the possibility of escalating
premiums and diluting policy limits to pay his own costs and judgments.
This note will first give an overview of additional insured endorsements
and describe the courts’ evolution in interpreting them. It will then provide
reasoning and analysis for why the courts’ current broad interpretation of these
endorsements is flawed. Lastly, it will propose a solution. First, though,
consider the following hypothetical.
II. A HYPOTHETICAL: TROUBLE IN PARADISE
Imagine the year is 1995, and you are a small specialty subcontractor who
has just submitted a $20,000 bid to waterproof the decks at the Paradise Condo
job. It is a large, new construction project, involving an architect, developer,
general contractor (GC), and numerous subcontractors (subs). The GC
ultimately chooses you to perform the waterproofing instead of the several
other subs bidding on the job, but only if you agree to sign his subcontract.
The subcontract requires you to, among other things, name the owner,
architect, developer, and GC as additional insureds on your liability policy.
Needing the business you comply, and within a year Paradise Condo is
completed, and the new unit owners move in. Everyone is happy.
It is now 2004, nine years later, and you have just been slapped with a
lawsuit. The unit owners of Paradise Condo have filed suit against the GC,
developer, and architect for various construction defects related to the
structural components, decks, and balconies of the condos. Although the
complaint itself does not allege any specific deficiencies in your work, you are
brought into the lawsuit both through a third party claim by the GC and
because the developer and GC have decided to tender their defenses to your
insurance carrier. Even though there were numerous other subs working on the
same project who had also named the developer and GC as additional insureds,
they have chosen to tender their defenses to your insurer because, after all
these years, you are one of the few subs still in business and able to be located
and also because you have one of the best insurance policies. After discovery
you find your fault to be about five percent of the total of the two million
dollars demanded. Common sense says to settle with the owners for $100,000
and get out. The problem is that you are never fully released, as your insurer is
still paying all the developer’s and GC’s defense costs. Meanwhile, their
attorneys are racking up charge after charge, knowing full well that it is some
other insurer, and not their own clients, who is paying the bills. It is not long
before your $250,000 deductible is maxed out, leaving less available for your
own costs and judgments.
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What allowed this mess to happen? How could it have been prevented?
These issues are discussed in this note.
III. ADDITIONAL INSURED V. INDEMNITY PROVISIONS
Additional insured, not indemnity, provisions are the focus of this note.
However, before additional insured status can be fully understood it is helpful
to understand the similarities and differences between additional insured
provisions and indemnity provisions. Indemnity provisions are similar to
additional insured endorsements and impact them in many ways.3 An
indemnity, frequently referred to as a “hold harmless” agreement, creates an
obligation on the indemnitor to pay the cost of any loss or damage that an
indemnitee has incurred while acting at the indemnitor’s request.4 Essentially,
the indemnity agreement establishes which party will bear losses suffered
during the performance of the contract.5
Indemnity agreements are the most widely used and dependable noninsurance method for transferring the financial consequences of risk to another
party.6 Liabilities covered by indemnity agreements include defense costs,
judgments, settlements, and any other costs related to the resolution of the
injured party’s claim.7 For example, subcontractors typically agree to
indemnify and hold harmless general contractors for liability arising out of
their construction operations.8 This means that the subcontractor must pay the
general contractor’s defense, judgments, and/or settlement costs should the
contractor be held vicariously liable for injuries or damages caused by the
subcontractor.9 This indemnity provision is completely separate from the
subcontractor’s insurance.10 It is a personal agreement by which the
subcontractor agrees to reimburse the general contractor. The general
contractor is not covered by the subcontractor’s insurance and has no rights

3. See generally DONALD S. MALECKI ET AL., THE ADDITIONAL INSURED BOOK 58 (4th
ed. 2000).
4. Thomas M. Kurke, Contract Law — Has Pennsylvania Adopted an Express Negligence
Rule for Interpreting Broad, All-Inclusive Indemnity Agreements? — Ruzzi v. Butler Petroleum
Co., 588 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1991), 65 TEMP. L. REV. 679, 679 (1992). Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“indemnity” as “[t]o make good any loss, damage, or liability incurred by another.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 772 (7th ed. 1999).
5. Lisa Brener Cusimano, Contractual Indemnity Under Maritime and Louisiana Law, 43
LA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1982).
6. PATRICK J. WIELINSKI ET AL., CONTRACTUAL RISK TRANSFER: STRATEGIES FOR
CONTRACT INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE PROVISIONS § XI.B.1 (2003).
7. Samir B. Mehta, Additional Insured Status in Construction Contracts and Moral
Hazard, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 169, 178 (1996).
8. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 58.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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under the policy,11 although the subcontractor, when paying the general
contractor, will nearly always rely on his insurance to fund the obligation.12
There are three types of indemnities: the limited form indemnity, the
intermediate form indemnity, and the broad form indemnity.13 The limited
form indemnity requires the indemnitor (the subcontractor) to save and hold
harmless the indemnitee (the general contractor) only for the indemnitor’s own
negligence.14 The intermediate form indemnity requires the indemnitor to save
and hold harmless the indemnitee for all liability excluding that which arises
out of the indemnitee’s sole negligence.15 The broad form indemnity obligates
the indemnitor to save and hold harmless the indemnitee from all liabilities
arising from the project, regardless of which party’s negligence caused the
liability.16
Courts will generally uphold the limited and intermediate forms of
indemnity so long as they meet the requirements for a valid contract.17 The
broad form indemnity, however, has been held unenforceable in construction
contracts by many courts and state statutes on the ground that it violates public
policy.18 The Supreme Court confirmed this in United States v. M.O.
Seckinger stating that “[a] contractual provision should not be construed to
11. Id. at 2.
12. Mehta, supra note 7, at 174 n.29; Brief of Amicus Curiae American Subcontractors
Association at 9, Chrysler Corp. v. Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 796 A.2d 648 (Del. 2002) (No. 382001). Ideally, these indemnity agreements should blend together with the additional insured
obligation. However, in practice, the language of the indemnity agreement is rarely used in the
additional insured endorsement. Lisa Oonk, The Construction Industry: Coverage Issue Created
by Claims Against Additional Insureds, 28 THE BRIEF 8, 10 (1999). This leads to much litigation
regarding the scope of coverage for the additional insured. In the ensuing cases to interpret the
scope of the additional insured’s coverage, most courts will not look to the language of the
indemnity agreement and will look only to the language in the insurance contract. Id. But see
Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass’n, 620 P.2d 1102 (Idaho 1980).
13. Terry J. Galganski, Owners and Contractors Protective Liability: An Insurance Tool in
Construction, 15 CONSTR. L. 8, 12 (1995) [hereinafter Galganski, Owners and Contractors];
Mehta, supra note 7, at 179.
14. Galganski, Owners and Contractors, supra note 13, at 12; Mehta, supra note 7, at 179.
15. Galganski, Owners and Contractors, supra note 13, at 12-13; Mehta, supra note 7, at
179.
16. Galganski, Owners and Contractors, supra note 13, at 13; Mehta, supra note 7, at 179.
17. Mehta, supra note 7, at 179.
18. Id. The Utah Supreme Court articulated the major public policy argument against broad
form indemnities in Jankele v. Texas Co., 54 P.2d 425 (Utah 1936), one of the earliest and most
often cited cases establishing courts’ unfavorable view of broad form indemnities:
Undoubtedly contracts exempting persons from liability for negligence induce a want of
care, for the highest incentive to the exercise of due care rests in a consciousness that a
failure in this respect will fix liability to make full compensation for any injury resulting
from the cause. It has therefore been declared to be good doctrine that no person may
contract against his own negligence.
Id. at 427.
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permit an indemnitee to recover for his own negligence . . . .”19 Justice
Brennan noted that the courts have had a “traditional reluctance” to “cast the
burden of negligent actions upon those that were not actually at fault . . .
particularly [where] there is a vast disparity in bargaining power . . . between
the parties.”20
As of 2003, thirty-four states have passed laws invalidating broad form
indemnity provisions in construction contracts as unenforceable as against
public policy.21 Courts in states that have not passed such laws show their
opposition to these agreements by applying the “clear and unequivocal” test.22
This test states that in order for a broad form indemnity to be enforceable, there
must be clear and unequivocal terms in the contract articulating the parties’
intent to require such a broad obligation.23 Statutes and strict tests invalidating
broad form indemnities are the result of strong public policy arguments against
allowing an indemnitor to save and hold harmless an indemnitee for the
indemnitee’s own negligence in construction contracts.24 An indemnitee,
protected from consequences of his negligence, has little incentive to take
measures to avoid causing injuries.25 By preventing owners and contractors
from contracting away their duties to the public and to workers, these
19. United States v. M.O. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 211 (1970).
20. Id. at 211-12. The cases that the Court chose to cite in support of this proposition
illustrate the long history that it has enjoyed: Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 90
(1955); Otis Elevator Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 33 P.2d 974, 977 (Colo. 1934); Sternaman v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 763, 766 (N.Y. 1902); Johnson’s Adm’x v. Richmond & D.R. Co.,
11 S.E. 829, 829-30 (Va. 1890).
21. American Subcontractors Association, Inc., Subcontractor’s Chart of Anti-Indemnity
Statutes, at http://www.asaonline.com/pdf/AntiIndemnityChart.pdf (last updated May 2, 2003).
Many of these statutes were enacted in the 1970s in response to inequitable and rarely negotiated
form agreements that forced contractors to indemnify owners and architects from their own
negligence. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Subcontractors Association at 27, Barton-Marlow
Co. v. Grunau Co., 835 So.2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 2D-01-3347).
22. Mehta, supra note 7, at 180. For cases applying this test see, e.g., Craig Constr. Co. v.
Hendrix, 568 So.2d 752, 756 (Ala. 1990); Washington Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6. v. Baglino Corp.,
817 P.2d 3, 6 (Ariz. 1991) (en banc); Arkansas Kraft Corp. v. Boyed Sanders Constr. Co., 764
S.W.2d 452, 453 (Ark. 1989); Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 396 P.2d 377, 379 (Cal.
1964) (en banc); State v. Interstate Amiesite Corp., 297 A.2d 41, 44 (Del. 1972); Rodrigue v.
LeGros, 563 So. 2d 248, 254 (La. 1990); Parliament Constr. Co. v. Beer Precast Concrete Ltd.,
319 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Mich. 1982); Braegelmann v. Horizon Dev. Co., 371 N.W.2d 644, 646
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. J.A. Tobin Constr. Co., 536 S.W.2d 881,
885 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey v. Honeywell Protective Serv.,
535 A.2d 974, 978 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Perry v. Payne, 66 A. 553, 555-56 (Pa.
1907); Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990).
23. Mehta, supra note 7, at 180-81.
24. Id. at 181.
25. Id. at 182; Brian Cubbage, Indemnity & Insurance Requirements from the Sub’s Point of
View, CFMA: BUILDING PROFITS, May/June 2003 at 3, available at http://www.cfma.org/
documents/Cubbage%20M_J%2003.pdf.
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prohibitions on broad form indemnities serve to protect construction workers
and the general public from suffering construction related injures by
encouraging accident prevention methods.26
IV. ADDITIONAL INSURED STATUS AND HOW IT HAPPENS
When a construction contract is awarded, all general contractors and
subcontractors working on the project will nearly always be required to carry a
certain amount of liability insurance that will pay defense, settlement, and
judgment costs should a claim arise for an injury or a construction defect.
“Named insureds” are the persons or businesses to whom the liability policy is
issued.27 The named insured pays the premium and deductibles, has the power
to cancel the policy, and is entitled to receive notice of cancellation from the
insurer.28
Because the possibility of death or injury readily exists with each
construction project, it is very likely that someone’s insurance will be called
upon at some point to defend or pay a judgment. Realizing this risk, it is very
common today for a property owner contractually to require his designer,
program manager, construction manager, and general contractor to name him
as an additional insured on their insurance policies.29 In turn, these stronger
parties push this insurance liability to the participant on the bottom: the
subcontractor.30 The additional insured (the general contractor) is thus given a
direct contractual relationship with the named insured’s (the subcontractor’s)
insurance carrier, but with no responsibilities to pay the policy premium.31
The additional insured receives the benefit of coverage under the named
insured’s policy, while it is the named insured that actually pays any additional
premium.32

26. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co. v. Mid-west Conveyor Co., 750 A.2d 518, 521 (Del. 2000);
Bosio v. Branigar Org., 506 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Guitard v. Gulf Oil Co., 670
P.2d 969, 972-73 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
27. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 11.
28. Id. at 14; WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.C.5.
29. Terry J. Galganski, The Insurance Exceptions of the Missouri Anti-Indemnity Statute
(Part I), 58 J. MO. B. 86, 88 (2002) [hereinafter Galganski, Insurance Exceptions].
30. Id.; Cubbage, supra note 25, at 2; Walsh Constr. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw, 76 P.3d 164,
169 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Audio Tape, House Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on
Commerce, SB 788, Tape 33, Slide A, (May 11, 1995) [statement of Representative Larry
Wells]).
31. Galganski, Insurance Exceptions, supra note 29, at 88.
32. Douglas R. Richmond, The Additional Problems of Additional Insureds, 33 TORT & INS.
L.J. 945, 948 (1998) [hereinafter Richmond, Additional Problems]. The additional insured,
however, does not have the same rights as the named insured. For example, the additional
insured has no right to be notified that the named insured’s policy has been cancelled. Mehta,
supra note 7, at 173.
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Additional insured status does not happen automatically. The general
contractor only becomes an additional insured after the subcontractor has
added an endorsement (an amendment) to his policy.33 These endorsements
typically come in one of two categories: either the “standard” form, developed
by the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for general use, or the “manuscript”
form, drafted by the insurance company for a specific situation.34 The most
common ISO “standard forms” are the ISO Endorsement Form CG 20 09 and
the ISO Endorsement Form CG 20 10.35
V. WHY GENERAL CONTRACTORS INSIST ON ADDITIONAL INSURED STATUS
Historically, additional insured endorsements have been considered to be
one of several valid techniques for the allocation of risks.36 The possibility of
bodily injury, property damage, and death readily exists with each construction
project.37 The construction industry accounted for 19.5% of workplace
fatalities in 2000 and 20.8% in 2001, even though the industry employed less
than 5.2% of the workforce in either year.38 In addition, the workers’
compensation laws of most states allow injured workers to sue the general
contractor for additional money, even if they have already collected from their
employer’s (the subcontractor’s) workers’ compensation insurer.39 Possible
construction defect lawsuits elevate the risks even higher.40 By hiring a
subcontractor, a general contractor exposes himself to these liability risks,

33. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 57; Galganski, Insurance Exceptions, supra note 29, at
88.
34. David R. Hendrick, Insurance Law: Understanding the Basics Regarding “Additional
Insureds,” 690 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE 591, 617 (2003).
35. Galganski, Owners and Contractors, supra note 13, at 14. The ISO CG 20 09
endorsement, also called the long form, adds additional insureds “but only with respect to liability
arising out of [the named insured’s work] for the additional insured or acts or omissions of the
additional insured in connection with their general supervision of [the named insured’s] work.”
Oonk, supra note 12, at 11. The ISO CG 20 10 endorsement, also called the short form, adds
additional insureds “but only with respect to liability arising out of” either “your work for that
insured by or for you” (1985 version) or “your ongoing operations performed for that insured”
(1993 version). Id. A third endorsement, the ISO CG 20 33, adds as an additional insured any
entity the named insured is contractually required to provide coverage for by changing the
classification of “Who is Insured” in the policy. Coverage is limited to the work, operations, or
facilities of the named insured. Id.
36. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 58; Thomas, supra note 2.
37. Galganski, Owners and Contractors, supra note 13, at 8.
38. Cubbage, supra note 25, at 1.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2. Construction defect claims can drag on for years and result in significantly large
settlements. For example, a decade-long Florida case recently ended with a $9 million verdict
awarded to fewer than 200 plaintiffs after a brand new courthouse was evacuated due to
complaints of mold growth. Id.
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including vicarious liability for his subcontractor’s negligence.41 Additional
insured endorsements are one way to allocate these risks in a way that probably
would not have occurred under common law in the absence of the contract.42
The original rationale for this contractual risk transfer was to make the party
with the most control over the risk responsible for suffering the financial loss
should it fail to prevent the loss from occurring.43 Recently, recognizing the
great potential these additional insured endorsements can have, general
contractors have begun to insist on them for many more reasons.
A.

Protecting His Own Insurance Policy

A general contractor does not want to deplete his own insurance to defend
claims, and he would prefer to involve the carrier to whom he is not paying a
premium when a claim arises.44 Although it has not been litigated in all
jurisdictions, courts have held that by tendering his defense to the
subcontractor’s insurer, the general contractor is assuring that his insurance
company will not be brought into the suit.45 This is known as a “targeted
The general contractor, as the additional insured on the
tender.”46
subcontractor’s policy, has the right to choose which insurer will defend him in
a lawsuit: his own or the subcontractor’s.47 If he chooses to tender his defense
41. John H. Mathias, Jr. & Timothy W. Burns, General Contractors and Subcontractors’
Insurers: The Additional Insured Provision, 89 ILL. B.J. 526, 526 (Oct. 2001).
42. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 58. In absence of a contract, the customary method of
allocating risk involved the court’s distinguishing between active and passive fault of the parties.
Id. at 44. Under common law, parties had to provide compensation only when their conduct
violated rules of negligence. Mehta, supra note 7, at 171.
43. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 58. The thought of most general contractors is that
since the subcontractors perform most of the daily work at the construction site, they rightly
deserve all the blame for most workplace accidents and faulty construction claims. Cubbage,
supra note 25, at 3. While many injuries and defects are the fault of the subcontractors, it is
unreasonable of general contractors to evade responsibility for all claims. See infra notes 235238 and accompanying text.
44. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.C.11; Mathias & Burns, supra note 41, at 526;
Gary D. Nelson, “Additional Insured” Endorsements: Conflicting Expectations, 24 THE BRIEF
29, 67 (1995). Additional insured coverage nearly always results in two or more policies
covering the same incident. Many issues are raised when this occurs, and this note only discusses
one of these. For discussion of these “other insurance” issues, see Douglas R. Richmond, Issues
and Problems in “Other Insurance,” Multiple Insurance, and Self Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REV.
1373 (1995); Richmond, Additional Problems, supra note 32, at 984-99.
45. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.C.21. As will be discussed later in this note, a
majority of courts hold that the subcontractor’s insurance company will still have an obligation to
pay defense and judgment costs even if the defect or injury was caused by the general
contractor’s sole negligence, if the general contractor has been named as an additional insured on
the subcontractor’s policy.
46. Id.
47. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 796 N.E.2d 1133,
1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); John Burns Constr. Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 727 N.E.2d 211, 215 (Ill.
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to the subcontractor’s insurer and requests no defense or indemnification from
his own insurer, the subcontractor’s insurer is then precluded from suing the
general contactor’s insurer for reimbursement of any money paid out on the
general contractor’s behalf.48 The general contractor will thus not be
responsible for paying any deductible, nor will his premiums increase or his
policy be cancelled, as his insurer will not be involved in paying any losses.
B.

Preventing Subrogation

Additional insured status precludes the subcontractor’s insurer from suing
the general contractor directly if the general contractor caused the loss.49
Normally, insurers have the right of subrogation, which is the legal right to
pursue recovery from third parties who are legally to blame for the loss.50
However, an insurer has no right of subrogation against its insured, which
includes an entity that holds the status of an additional insured.51 While some
jurisdictions limit the protection an additional insured has from subrogation, it
seems well settled that an additional insured is immune from subrogation so
long as the money paid out was within the defined scope of the additional
insured coverage.52
C. Reinforcing the Indemnity Agreement
Additional insured status achieves the same result as an indemnity
agreement without relying on the indemnity clause and without the hassles that
accompany indemnity agreements.53 Additional insured status gives the
general contractor direct rights to the subcontractor’s insurance policy.54
Unlike an indemnity clause where the general contactor must pay costs out of
his own pocket and then wait for reimbursement, additional insured status
provides immediate coverage for defense costs.55 The situation can become
2000); Inst. of London Underwriters v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992); MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 131.
48. See Inst. of London Underwriters, 599 N.E.2d at 1313.
49. Mehta, supra note 7, at 175.
50. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.4; Mehta, supra note 7, at 175.
51. Frank Briscoe Co. v. Georgia Sprinkler Co., 713 F.2d 1500, 1502 (11th Cir. 1983);
Airlines Reporting Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 31 Cal. App. 4th 1458, 1464 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995); Reeder v. Reeder, 348 N.W.2d 832, 836 (Neb. 1984); see Winkelmann v. Excelsior
Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 841, 843 (N.Y. 1995); First Nat’l Bank of Columbus v. Hansen, 267 N.W.2d
367, 371 (Wis. 1978). See also MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 79; Hendrick, supra note 34, at
614. Courts feel that allowing subrogation against its own insured places the insurer’s own
interest at variance with its insured since the insurer has less incentive to defend claims. See
MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 80.
52. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.4.
53. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 58.
54. Id. at 75; Mehta, supra note 7, at 177.
55. See MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 75; Mehta, supra note 7, at 176-77.
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more problematic if the subcontractor refuses to pay the general contractor, as
the general contractor must then expend more money to file a breach of
contract claim against the subcontractor. Additional insured status prevents
this. As soon as he learns of the case, the general contractor can tender the
defense directly to the subcontractor’s insurer, who must pay as the costs are
incurred.56 Additional insured status also results in the duty to defend
beginning at the time the claim is made, as opposed to indemnity agreements
in which the duty to defend may not arise until later in the proceeding, such as
after a ruling that the indemnitor was at fault.57
D. Circumventing the Indemnity Agreement
Additional insured status is a clever method to circumvent some states’
prohibitions against broad form indemnities.58 Even though most courts will
not allow the subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor for his own
negligence, courts do allow the subcontractor to provide both defense and
judgment coverage for the general contractor’s own negligence if there is an
additional insured endorsement in place.59 This situation arises most
frequently when the agreement is a broad form indemnity (agreeing to
indemnify for the general contractor’s sole negligence) because most states
have passed laws invalidating such agreements as against public policy.60
However, a majority of courts have held that providing another party with
insurance coverage is not the same as indemnifying that party, thus general
contractors can be covered for their sole negligence.61 After the court holds
56. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 78; Mehta, supra note 7, at 177.
57. Mehta, supra note 7, at 178.
58. See MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 62; WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.2;
Mehta, supra note 7, at 178.
59. Mehta, supra note 7, at 181.
60. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.2. See also supra note 21 and accompanying
text. As of 2003, only 8 states have not passed any type of law regarding indemnity provisions.
They are Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Vermont, and Wyoming.
American Subcontractors Association, Inc., Subcontractor’s Chart of Anti-Indemnity Statutes, at
http://www.asaonline.com/pdf/AntiIndemnityChart.pdf (last updated May 2, 2003).
61. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.2. Such cases include Shell Oil Co. v Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (state
law invalidating broad form indemnities does not outlaw an agreement to procure insurance for
another party’s sole negligence); Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Bragg Crane & Rigging Co., 225 Cal.
Rptr. 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (there is no limit in obtaining insurance despite the fact that state
law limits the amount of risk that can be transferred in an indemnity contract); Heat & Power
Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc., 578 A.2d 1202 (Md. 1990) (although state law prohibited
broad form indemnity agreements, a party insured under the indemnitor’s liability policy can be
insured against its sole fault); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 517 N.Y.S.2d
44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (the additional insured was ordered to be protected by the named
insured’s policy even after the indemnity agreement between the parties was held void as against
public policy).
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the broad form indemnity agreement between the subcontractor and general
contractor unenforceable, the general contractor can simply look for coverage
directly under the subcontractor’s insurance policy and achieve the same
result.62
VI. EVOLUTION OF THE COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF
ADDITIONAL INSURED ENDORSEMENTS
It is not disputed that all the provisions of an insurance policy that apply to
the named insured also apply to the additional insured.63 However, whether
the additional insured should be covered for his own acts of negligence, or
covered only if the additional insured is held vicariously liable for acts of the
named insured, is disputed. Additional insured endorsements began as a risk
shifting tool to cover the general contractor’s costs should he be found
vicariously liable for an act of his subcontractor.64 It was with this purpose in
mind that the courts originally interpreted these provisions to allow coverage
only when the additional insured was held vicariously liable for acts of the
named insured.65
A case illustrative of the courts’ original interpretation of additional
insured endorsements is Harbor Insurance Co. v. Lewis.66 In this case, the
City of Philadelphia attempted to obtain coverage for a three million dollar
verdict that had been entered against both the city and the Reading Railroad.
The verdict came after a trial in which the plaintiff, a young boy, alleged that
he suffered severe injuries after being run over by a train operated by the
Reading Railroad in an area located near a fence that had been negligently
maintained by the City of Philadelphia. The city had been named an additional
insured on Reading’s insurance policy, issued by Harbor Insurance (“Harbor”).
The additional insured endorsement stated that the City of Philadelphia was
provided insurance as an additional insured on the policy issued to the railroad,
but “only to the extent of liability resulting from occurrences arising out of
negligence of Reading Company and/or its wholly owned subsidiaries.”67
The Harbor Court made several findings of fact before announcing its
decision. The court found that additional insured provisions are “intended to
62. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.B.2.
63. Oakland Stadium v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 313 P.2d 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957);
Hendrick, supra note 34, at 624. The Oakland Court held that the additional insured endorsement
incorporated all exclusions included in the main policy. Any other holding, the court stated,
would put the additional insured in a better position than the named insured who paid the
premium and would accordingly be “absurd.” Oakland Stadium, 313 P.2d at 605.
64. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 624.
65. Id.
66. 562 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1983). All facts in this paragraph are taken from pages 80102 of the court’s opinion.
67. Id. at 801.
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protect parties who are not named insureds from exposure to vicarious liability
for acts of the named insured.”68 The court further found that Harbor did not
charge any additional premium for the additional insured endorsement and that
insurers typically will not increase or change the risks insured against without
charging an additional premium.69 The court went on to discuss the intent of
the parties, finding that Harbor intended this endorsement to be a routine
endorsement issued to cover additional insureds for vicarious liability that
might result from acts of the named insured.70 The court also pointed out that
the City of Philadelphia stipulated that it did not look to or rely on the Harbor
policy when making its own insurance decisions.71
Based on the language in the policy as well as the intent of the parties, the
court found that Harbor agreed to the additional insured endorsement only
because its coverage was restricted to the City of Philadelphia’s vicarious
liability for Reading Railroad’s activities.72 The court concluded that the City
of Philadelphia was not covered for liability resulting from its own
negligence.73
The court in American Country Insurance Co. v. Cline74 made similar
findings and limited the general contractor’s coverage as an additional insured
to vicarious liability. This court similarly recognized that the subcontractor
received an unlimited number of additional insured endorsements for a single
$150 premium; thus, it made sense that the additional insured should only
receive coverage for a narrow group of claims (i.e., those arising in strict
liability).75 The court went on to recognize that it would be inequitable to
allow the additional insured to avoid its responsibility for its own conduct and
to seek full coverage when the insurer has not been compensated
accordingly.76 The court noted that the general contractor carried his own
general liability coverage to cover liability arising from his own work.77 If the
general contractor wanted the same level of coverage that he already received
from his own insurer, then the subcontractor’s insurer should have received a
larger premium payment.78

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 803.
Id.
Id.
Harbor Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. at 804.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 805-06.
722 N.E.2d 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 761-62.
Id. at 762.
Id.
Id.
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Although the court in Granite Construction v. Bituminous Insurance Co.79
did not make any specific findings, it nevertheless limited coverage of the
additional insured. In this case, Granite Construction (“Granite”) sought
coverage for a lawsuit brought by an employee of Joe Brown Company
(“Brown”), a subcontractor hired by Granite to haul asphalt materials from its
construction site. By contract, Granite agreed to load the trucks that Brown
was to use to haul the asphalt. Brown had obtained insurance and named
Granite as an additional insured on the policy. The endorsement read, “The
‘Persons Insured’ provision is amended to include as an insured the person or
organization named below [Granite] but only with respect to liability arising
out of operations performed for such insured [Granite] by or on behalf of the
named insured [Brown].”
A Brown employee was injured and filed a negligence action against
Granite, claiming that Granite had negligently loaded its truck in such a
manner that the truck had overturned and injured him.80 Granite then asserted
that it was entitled to coverage under the additional insured endorsement.81
The court, however, rejected that argument, stating that the endorsement
restricted the carrier’s liability to those acts specifically performed by Brown
and did not extend to operations performed by Granite itself.82 Because the
complaint stated that Granite’s liability arose out of its own loading operations,
it was not a claim “arising out of operations performed for [Granite] by or on
behalf of [Brown].”83 Therefore, the Texas appellate court held that Brown’s
insurance carrier owed no obligation to defend Granite on those claims.84
The court in Valentine v. Aetna Insurance Co. recognized that “it would be
unreasonable to assume that a subcontractor would agree to procure liability
insurance for all of the general contractor’s operations . . . .”85 The court in
Anaconda Co. v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp.86 made a
similar finding. In this case the owner, Anaconda, required his general
contractor, McKee, to name him as an additional insured on his liability policy,
insuring against risks of any kind relating to the construction at its smelter
facilities.87 Later, one of McKee’s subcontractor’s employees was injured
when an Anaconda employee dropped a plank some thirty feet striking him.88

79. 832 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App. 1992). All facts in this paragraph are taken from page 428
of the court’s opinion.
80. Id. at 428.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 430.
83. Id.
84. Granite Constr. Co., 832 S.W.2d at 430.
85. 564 F.2d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1977).
86. 616 P.2d 363 (Mont. 1980).
87. Id. at 364.
88. Id.
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He filed suit against Anaconda, alleging that the negligence of Anaconda’s
employee caused his injury.89 Anaconda made a formal demand to McKee’s
insurer, General Accident, requesting a defense, and the insurance company
denied coverage.90 In the ensuing case, to determine whether General
Accident owed a duty to defend Anaconda, the court acknowledged,
Were we to focus merely on the activities of the injured workman and
not the activities of the named insureds [McKee], we would render
application of [the contract] overly broad and make General Accident
the insurer of all Anaconda activities at the Smelter that resulted in
injuries to anyone working pursuant to the contract, regardless of
control and benefit. This Court will place no such burden on anyone.91
These cases demonstrate the courts’ concern for the inequality of placing
the burdens of defense and indemnification on a party who has very little
control in preventing that loss from occurring. They also demonstrate that the
courts are willing to follow both the intent of the parties and the plain language
of the endorsements. Courts are not straining to find coverage for the
additional insured because they recognize that the general contractor carries his
own insurance to cover his own operations.
VII. EMERGING INTERPRETATION
Developers and general contractors have become more sophisticated over
the last decade.92 They now assert that additional insured coverage is intended
to protect them from their own liability as well.93 Unfortunately, courts have
listened to them. The reason for this shift is not entirely clear. One
commentator suggests that it is because the courts do not have an
understanding of the parties’ contractual relationship and have failed to
appreciate the unique circumstances involved in an additional insured
controversy.94 Therefore, they are blindly treating disputes over additional

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Anaconda Co., 616 P.2d at 366.
92. Richard H. Glucksman & Glenn T. Barger, Additional Insured Endorsements: Their
Vital Importance in Construction Defect Litigation, 21 WTR CONSTR. L. 30, 30 (2001).
93. Id. For years, parties paid little attention to additional insured policies until economic
pressures in the construction industry in the 1990s changed the focus. Parties began to pursue
aggressively claims for recovery of costs and contribution to claim settlements. Thomas, supra
note 2.
94. Mark Pomerantz, Recognizing the Unique Status of Additional Named Insureds, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 117, 120 (1984). Although Mr. Pomerantz’s contentions apply to what he
refers to as “additional named insureds,” for purposes of this note his definition of “additional
named insureds” is analogous to “additional insureds” discussed in this note. “This [an additional
named insured] is an entity specifically designated as an insured subsequent to the issuance of the
original policy. A party typically becomes an additional named insured pursuant to an agreement
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insured coverage just as they would disputes over coverage for the named
insured.95 Whatever the reason, however, liberal interpretation of additional
insured endorsements is quickly becoming the majority rule.96
Courts now broadly construe any and all language contained in these
endorsements, striving to find coverage for the additional insured general
contractor. Because most endorsements contain some form of the language,
“but only with respect to liability arising out of the named insured’s work,”
this note will focus on the courts’ interpretation of these phrases.97
A.

“Arising Out Of”

One commentator recently noted that “‘arising out of’ has been construed
to be so broad and general as to cover virtually anything having the least bit to
do with the named insured’s work.”98 Several cases illustrate this point. A
California appellate court in Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Syufy Enterprises
required only a minimal showing of causation to find the insurer had a duty to
defend the additional insured.99 The plaintiff, an employee of C&C, the
general contractor, was injured while climbing through a hatch on the roof that
had been negligently maintained by the building owner, Syufy Enterprises
(“Syufy”).100 He sued the owner for his injuries.101 The endorsement adding
Syufy as an additional insured provided that Syufy was included as an insured
under the policy, “but only with respect to liability arising out of ‘your work’
for that insured by or for you.”102 The policy stated that “you” and “your”
referred to C&C, the named insured.103 It defined “your work” as “[w]ork or
operations performed by you or on your behalf.”104 The owner tendered his
defense to the contractor’s insurer, Acceptance Insurance Co. (“Acceptance”),
even though the owner was himself fully insured.105 Acceptance attempted to
deny coverage by claiming that the plaintiff was injured while exiting the roof
obligating the named insured to add the additional named insured to the named insured’s preexisting policy.” Id. at 119.
95. Id. at 120.
96. Richmond, Additional Problems, supra note 32, at 958; Douglas R. Richmond & Darren
S. Black, Expanding Liability Coverage: Insured Contracts and Additional Insureds, 44 DRAKE
L. REV. 781, 801 (1996); Cusack, supra note 2.
97. For an extensive compilation of courts’ interpretations of a variety of additional insured
endorsements, see Nelson, supra note 44.
98. Lawrence A. Steckman & James J. Cleary Jr., Construction Industry AIE’s: Problems of
Contract Interpretation and Solutions, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 78, 90 (1998).
99. Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Syufy Enters., 69 Cal. App. 4th 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
100. Id. at 323.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 324.
103. Id.
104. Acceptance Ins. Co., 69 Cal. App. 4th at 324.
105. Id.
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through the hatch and that his work was limited to the roof itself.106 Therefore,
Acceptance claimed that the injury did not “arise out of” the named insured’s
work.107 In addition, Acceptance argued that the endorsement should be
limited to situations where the owner is held vicariously liable for acts of the
contractor.108
The court rejected Acceptance’s arguments noting that “arising out of”
language “[d]oes not import any particular standard of causation or theory of
liability into an insurance policy. Rather, it broadly links a factual situation
with the event creating liability, and connotes only a minimal causal
connection or incidental relationship.”109 The court found that, because the
plaintiff could not have done his work without passing through the hatch, the
connection between the injury and the work was more than incidental; thus, the
“arising out of” requirement was satisfied.110 The fact that the defect was
solely caused by Syufy’s negligence was irrelevant.111
Similarly, in Shell Oil Co. v. AC & S, Inc., Shell Oil Co. (“Shell”) filed a
declaratory judgment action against two subcontractors and their insurers
claiming that it was entitled to defense and indemnity for a personal injury suit
filed against Shell by one of the subcontractor’s employees.112 Shell was the
owner of the property and had hired Bechtel as the general contractor.113
Bechtel hired Sachs as a subcontractor, who in turn hired AC & S as his
subcontractor.114 The plaintiff, Neels, was an employee of AC & S.115 The
contract between Sachs and AC & S incorporated by reference the contract
between Shell and Bechtel.116 Pursuant to those contracts, AC & S and Sachs
each obtained general liability policies naming Shell as an additional
insured.117
Neels was injured when he tripped over a pipe on Shell’s premises.118
Neither AC & S nor Sachs was alleged to be at fault. In fact, it was undisputed
that neither of them was in any way responsible for the pipe.119 When Shell

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 326.
Id.
Id. at 330-31.
Acceptance Ins. Co., 69 Cal. App. 4th at 328.
Id.
Id. at 328-29.
Shell Oil Co. v. AC & S, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 946, 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Shell Oil Co., 649 N.E.2d at 948.
Id.
Id. at 951-52.
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tendered its defense to AC & S’s and Sach’s insurers, respectively National
Union and Transamerica, both refused coverage.120
Both endorsements naming Shell as an additional insured contained similar
language and the phrase “arising out of.”121 The court noted that the phrase
“arising out of” is both broad and vague and therefore “must be liberally
construed in favor of the insured; accordingly, ‘but for’ causation, not
necessarily proximate causation, satisfies this language.”122 National Union
argued that the endorsement unambiguously limited coverage to work
performed by the subcontractors and that the pipe over which Neels tripped
had nothing to do with the work being performed by either subcontractor.123
Additionally, it was Shell, the additional insured, that had drafted the “arising
out of” language, giving National Union the added argument that if the phrase
was ambiguous, it should be construed against Shell.124 Nevertheless, the
court held that Neels’s injuries arose from the subcontractor’s operations
because Neels would not have been on Shell’s premises “but for” the
operations of the subcontractor, his employer.125 The court ruled in favor of
Shell, ordering it to be covered as an additional insured for both defense and
indemnity purposes.126
In summary, in the preceding two cases the named insured did absolutely
nothing wrong. However, in both cases because of the expansive reading of
the additional insured endorsement by the court, the faultless named insured
was forced to pay anyway.

120. Id. at 948.
121. Id. at 950.
122. Shell Oil Co., 649 N.E.2d at 951.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 952.
126. Id. The list goes on and on. Other cases supporting broad interpretation of “arising out
of” language in additional insured endorsements include: Merch. Ins. Co. of New Hampshire v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 143 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1998); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 683 N.E. 2d 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Turner Constr. Co.,
601 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Lim v. Atlas-Gem Erectors Co., 225 A.2d 304 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996); Township of Springfield v. Ersek, 660 A.2d 672 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995). In
addition, slight deviations from the “arising out of” language are of no benefit to insurers and
subcontractors. See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Regis Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.96-CIV-1790, 1997
WL 164268 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1997) (“as a result of” language imposed no greater causation than
“arising out of”); Con’t Heller Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996) (“resulting from” the named insured’s work standard is met even when the injured
named insured’s employee was just fetching some tools); Travelers Indem. Co. v. LLJV Dev.
Corp., 643 N.Y.S.2d 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“by or on behalf of” language included
operations performed by additional insured employee’s operations).
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“Your Work”

In addition to broadly construing the phrase “arising out of,” courts also
broadly construe the term “your work.” A commentator noted:
Absent an extremely clear and unambiguous restriction on an
additional insured endorsement, it is clear that the courts will interpret
such endorsements to provide full coverage for the additional insured
not only for vicarious liability, but also for acts of its own negligence,
as long as they are related to the work contemplated in the underlying
agreement.127
In Pardee Construction Co. v. Insurance Co. of the West, the appellate
court held that the unambiguous language of the policies and endorsements
provided the general contractor (the additional insured) with coverage for
completed operations of the subcontractors (the named insureds).128 In this
case the general contractor, Pardee Construction Co. (“Pardee”), had been
named as an additional insured on all of his subcontractors’ policies for a
project in San Diego.129 When the owners sued him a few years later for
various construction defects, he tendered his defense to all of his
subcontractors’ insurers, four of whom denied coverage claiming that
additional insured coverage did not apply to completed operations.130 The
endorsements provided Pardee coverage for liability arising out of the
subcontractor’s work for Pardee.131 The subcontract itself between Pardee and
his subcontractors defined the phrase “your work” as “Your work will be
deemed completed at the earliest of the following times: (1) when the work
called for in your contract has been completed. . . or (2) when that part of the
work to be done at the job site has been put to its intended use. . . .”132
However, the court refused to look beyond the language in the endorsement or
in the insurance policies to consider the language of the subcontract. The court
held that the unambiguous language of the policies and endorsements provided
Pardee with coverage for completed operations of the named insured
subcontractors.133 The court noted that the policy provided coverage limited
only by the phrase “liability arising out of your [the named insured’s] work for
the [additional insured] by or for you.”134 The court stated that “the insurers
failed to expressly limit covered completed operations as to time or particular

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Joel M. Simon, Coverage for the Additional Insured, N.Y. L. J., Jan 8, 1996, at 1.
92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 446-47.
Id. at 447-49.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455 n.13.
Pardee Constr. Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453-54.
Id. at 454.
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project in their policy and endorsement language. [Such failure] implies a
manifested intent not to do so.”135
Courts have also held that if the subcontractor installs the work, it is “his
work” for purposes of additional insured endorsement interpretation, regardless
of whether or not the work deviates from the original subcontract. In Travelers
Indemnity Co. v Westfield Insurance Co., Hoar Construction (“Hoar”) was the
general contractor for the renovation of a department store. 136 The installation
of the floor coverings was subcontracted out to Turner Brook, Inc. (“Turner”),
who was insured by the Westfield Insurance Co. (“Westfield”).137 Under the
subcontractor’s agreement, Turner was required to install flooring first and
then paper to protect it.138 However, when other aspects of the project outside
Turner’s control fell behind, it became apparent that more heavy construction
work would occur after the floor was laid than originally anticipated.139 Hoar
instructed Turner to use more durable Masonite panels instead of paper to
protect the floor.140
An employee of another subcontractor sustained injuries after allegedly
tripping over a piece of Masonite and brought suit against the property owner
and general contractor.141 Hoar had been named as an additional insured on
Turner’s policy, “but only with respect to liability arising out of your
[Turner’s] work.”142 The general contractor tendered his defense to Westfield,
Turner’s insurer, who refused coverage.143 Westfield argued that because the
injured employee alleged that the Masonite panels had caused his injury, the
panels did not “arise out of” but were merely incidental to Turner’s work.144
The court, noting that broad and ambiguous language must be strictly
construed against the insurer to maximize coverage, rejected this argument and
ordered Westfield to defend Hoar in the underlying claim.145 The court also
concluded that no level of causation is required for determining when liability
“arises out of” a subcontractor’s work.146

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 454, 456.
No. 97-2190, 1999 WL 98586, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Travelers Indem. Co., 1999 WL 98586 at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Travelers Indem. Co., 1999 WL 98586 at *3.
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C. Broad Duty to Defend
Courts continue to expand the liability of subcontractors and their
insurance companies. Not only do they bend over backwards to construe the
endorsement language against the insurer, but there is also a growing majority
finding that the duty to defend means that the insurer selected to defend owes
the additional insured a complete and prompt defense, even though other
insurers may well be equally responsible to defend the claim.147 This situation
most commonly arises when the general contractor has been named an
additional insured on several of his subcontractors’ policies. If a case is
tendered to him, the insurer must fully fund the defense and may not argue
about which portions of the lawsuit are covered and which are not and/or
which insurers are obligated to concurrently fund portions of the defense
costs.148 This was confirmed in the case of Presley Homes, Inc. v. American
States Insurance Co.149 In this case, various homeowners sued Presley Homes
(“Presley”), a real estate development company, for defects in the construction
of their homes.150 Presley sought coverage for the suit pursuant to additional
insured agreements it had procured with several of its subcontractors.151 Two
of those subcontractors had policies with American States Insurance
(“American States”).152 American States agreed that it had a duty to defend
Presley but claimed that its defense obligation was limited to the claims
involving work performed by its named insured subcontractors, and thus it
only offered to pay a percentage of Presley’s defense costs.153 When Presley
and American States could not come to an agreement on a defense, Presley
demanded a “full and complete defense” from American States.154 The court
agreed with Presley and held that American States carried not just an equitable
portion of the defense, but it was also obligated to defend Presley, fully and
completely, in the entire action.155 American States was thereafter fully
empowered to seek equitable contribution from all other potentially
responsible carriers but could not rely on its endorsement to limit the defense
obligation that it had to Presley, the additional insured.156 Essentially, the
holding of this case is that when the additional insured seeks a defense from a

147. WIELINSKI ET AL., supra note 6, at § XI.C.19.
148. Id.
149. Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686 (Cal Ct. App.
2001). For one commentator’s view on how this case has changed the duty to defend, see David
Ezra, How Presley Homes Has Changed the Duty to Defend, 26 L.A. LAW. 17 (2003).
150. Presley Homes, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 688.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Presley Homes, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
156. See id.
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carrier that has named it as an additional insured, the additional insured is
entitled to a full and complete defense, notwithstanding the fact that the named
insured is not fully responsible for all damages arising out of the project.157
The case further confirms that the duty to defend is a broad one and will
implicate any carrier, regardless of how potentially small his indemnity
obligation may be.158
VIII. WHAT THE COURTS ARE NOT SEEING
When interpreting these additional insured endorsements, the courts’
attitude seems to reflect the impression that this is only the insurance
company’s money, and that insurance exists for the protection of the insured.
Courts do not seem to consider or even recognize the impact on the
subcontractor when its policy is called upon to defend. Broad interpretation of
these additional insured endorsements dramatically increases the number of
times the subcontractor’s insurer becomes involved in lawsuits and has several
detrimental effects on the subcontractor.
A.

Policy Dilution

Affording broad additional insured coverage dilutes the subcontractor’s
policy limits.159 In a large construction dispute, there are surely other insureds
permitted to make claims against the same policy, and thus the policy’s limits
can become depleted quickly.160 With so many parties entitled to make claims
against the named insured’s policy, the probability exists that claims by these
additional insureds may exhaust coverage in favor of additional insureds and
leave the named insured without coverage, or worse, exposed to any
unsatisfied additional insureds.161 Even if only one other party is making
claims against the subcontractor’s policy, every dollar paid out on his behalf
reduces money available for the subcontractor.
B.

Increasing Premiums

Allowing broad additional insured coverage that includes coverage for the
negligent actions of others increases the potential for claims and losses.
Because most subcontractors’ policies are not purchased on a project-by157. See id.
158. It is this case that allows the general contractor and developer in our hypothetical to
choose you, and only you, to defend them in the lawsuit. They are neither responsible nor
required to find any other potential subcontractors who may be at fault and are entitled to a full
and complete defense from your insurance carrier.
159. Steckman & Cleary, supra note 97, at 82.
160. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 71; Hendrick, supra note 34, at 632.
161. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 642. When the policy limits have been exhausted, the
insurer is released from any further responsibility, whether it is to the additional insured or to the
named insured. Id. at 635.
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project basis,162 the insurer maintains an experience rating of these claims and
losses.163 The insurer then applies these claims and losses in the future when
determining coverage and premiums for the subcontractor.164 In many cases,
this can mean outright non-renewal of the policy and the inability to get
coverage at any cost.165 If the carrier does agree to renew the policy, bad risk
experience can only mean higher future premiums for the subcontractor.166
This “hidden” cost is not fully passed on to the general contractor in the form
of construction costs because it is not apparent at the time the subcontractor
submits a price quote to the general contractor.167 The minimal fee charged to
the subcontractor for the actual endorsement is only a portion of the
subcontractor’s cost.168 Clearly it is the subcontractor alone who is bearing all
of the future cost of the policy, not the general contractor who is only
indirectly paying for a portion of the unaffected current risk.169 Ironically, the
small subcontractor, bearing all the future costs, is the party least able to
absorb the insurance costs caused by the negligence of other parties.170
C. Deductibles
Nearly all insurance policies have a deductible that must be satisfied before
the policy will begin to pay for judgments, settlements, and, in some cases,
defense costs.171 The named insured is liable for the deductible, which can
range anywhere from a couple of thousand to a couple of million dollars.172
Paying this deductible is not so problematic if the subcontractor has a great
deal of liability on his own, as he would be responsible for it anyway.
However, this becomes very problematic if the subcontractor is found to be
completely without fault or at fault for only a couple of thousand dollars. In
such a situation, the subcontractor is being forced to pay the deductible out of
his own pocket to satisfy the liabilities of another party. This can present a
severe hardship on the subcontractor, as most subcontractors are small entities

162. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Subcontractors Association at 7, Chrysler Corp. v.
Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 796 A.2d 648 (Del. 2002) (No. 38-2001).
163. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 643.
164. Id.
165. Cubbage, supra note 25, at 1.
166. MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 71; Hendrick, supra note 34, at 643; Brief of Amicus
Curiae at 10, Chrysler Corp. (No. 38-2001).
167. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 643.
168. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 7, Chrysler Corp. (No. 38-2001).
169. Id.; see Hendrick, supra note 34, at 643.
170. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 12, Chrysler Corp. (No. 38-2001).
171. See MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 71; Hendrick, supra note 34, at 644; Cubbage,
supra note 25, at 1. Some policies will pay defense costs immediately; the deductible must be
paid only before the insurer will pay any settlement or judgment costs.
172. See MALECKI ET AL., supra note 3, at 63.
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with limited resources.173 Many subcontractors agree to large deductibles
because large deductibles mean smaller premium payments; however, maxing
out the deductible payment can devastate a small subcontractor.
There is no difference between dollars paid by the subcontractor before the
deductible has been met and dollars paid by the insurance company after the
deductible has been exceeded.174 As mentioned previously, an insurer has no
right of subrogation against its insured.175 Therefore, the subcontractor has no
cause of action against the general contractor for money he has paid out to
satisfy his deductible, even if the money paid out was due to the sole fault of
the general contractor.
D. No Accountability
Normally, an insurance company has complete control over the defense of
its insureds, which entails the right to select the lawyer for its insured.176
However, in the additional insured context, the subcontractors providing the
insurance are normally not named in the initial lawsuit but are brought in much
later only because the general contactor has tendered his defense to the
subcontractor’s insurer. The general contactor thus has already selected his
lawyer, who has already expended time on his client’s case.
Insurers have an enhanced duty of good faith, and failure to satisfy this
enhanced obligation may expose the insurer to liability.177 Thus, the insurer,
not wanting to separate the general contractor from a lawyer who has already
expended time on the lawsuit and potentially expose itself to bad faith
damages, normally agrees to pay the lawyer the general contractor has already
selected and waives its right to select counsel for the additional insured.178
This puts the defense in the hands of lawyers who have little or no
accountability as another insurer, and not their client, is paying the bills.179 It
is an open invitation to do unnecessary work at someone else’s expense.180
Even if the insurer does select counsel for the general contractor, it will, at
the very least, have to select separate counsel for the general contractor and the

173. Berardi v. Getty Ref. & Mktg Co., 107 Misc. 2d 451, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
174. E-mail from Jack O’Neil, General Counsel, The Western Group, (Jan. 9, 2004) (on file
with author).
175. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
176. Douglas R. Richmond, Walking a Tightrope: The Tripartite Relationship Between
Insurer, Insured, and Insurance Defense Counsel, 73 NEB. L. REV. 265, 269 (1994) [hereinafter
Richmond, Walking a Tightrope].
177. Id. at 276-77. For various bad faith issues that can arise specifically in the context of
additional insured coverage, see Oonk, supra note 12, at 13-14.
178. E-mail from Jack O’Neil, General Counsel, The Western Group, (Aug. 26, 2003) (on file
with author).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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subcontractor as these parties will nearly always have adverse interests (i.e.,
the subcontractor will be claiming the general contractor caused the building
defect or injury, while the general contractor will be arguing the same against
the subcontractor). In such situations, the insurer has a duty to assign separate
counsel for both parties.181 This leads to higher defense costs, which erode and
reduce available coverage for the subcontractor.
IX. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF WHY THIS INTERPRETATION IS FLAWED
A.

Additional Insured Disputes Are Unique

In construing these additional insured endorsements, courts are applying
the well founded principle of insurance contract interpretation that all
ambiguities in an insurance contract should be construed against the insurance
company and in favor of coverage.182 However, this principle is not as suitable
for determining coverage for the additional insured as it is for the named
insured because the following two rationales for construing insurance contracts
against the drafter are not applicable in the additional insured context.
The first justification for construing all insurance terms against the
insurance company is that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion for
which the insurer supplies the terms.183 An adhesion contract is a form
contract created by the stronger of the contracting parties and is offered on a
“take it or leave it” basis.184 The terms are imposed upon the weaker party
who has no choice but to agree because the weaker party is usually unable to
look elsewhere for a more favorable contract.185 Therefore, all ambiguities

181. See Richmond, Walking a Tightrope, supra note 176, at 279.
182. In disputes over coverage for the additional insured, courts are applying this well
founded principle of insurance law but offer only conclusory statements as to why this type of
dispute should be treated in the same way that disputes over coverage for the named insured are.
See, e.g., Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Syufy Enter., 69 Cal. App. 4th 321, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(“This language [“arising out of”] does not import any particular standard of causation or theory
of liability into an insurance policy”) (emphasis added); Maryland Cas. v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
65 Cal. App. 4th 21, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“Although Gray arose in the context of a defense
duty owed to [a] named insured, its holding applies equally to an insured added by
endorsement.”).
183. Greenly v. Mariner Mgmt. Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999); Great Divide
Ins. Co. v. Carpenter ex rel. Reed, 79 P.3d 599, 606 (Alaska 2003); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Burr, 706
A.2d 499, 500-01 (Del. 1998); First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Am. Sandblasting Co., 477 S.E.2d 390, 392
(Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Dairy Road Partners v. Island Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 93, 106-07 (Haw. 2000);
Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 242, 245 (Idaho 2003); Masonic Temple Ass’n
of Crawfordsville v. Indiana Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 799 N.E.2d 21, 27-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002);
Burge v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 933 P.2d 210, 219 (N.M. 1996); Symington v. Walle Mut. Ins.
Co., 563 N.W.2d 400, 403 (N.D. 1997).
184. Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
185. Id.
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should be construed against the drafter and in favor of coverage because the
insured did not supply any of the terms.186
None of these factors are present in the additional insured context. An
additional insured is not forced to “take the policy or leave it,” but rather is
asking to be added to a preexisting policy.187 The contract is not offered by the
stronger insurance company, but by the subcontractor. This lacks the
oppressive features of an adhesion contract because it is the result of
negotiation between two strong parties, the subcontractor and the general
contractor. If anything, the subcontractor is the weaker party, not the
additional insured general contractor. Additionally, the general contractor has
many alternative places to turn. There are literally hundreds of subcontractors
that general contractors could turn to should one refuse to include the language
he desires in the additional insured endorsement. For these reasons, an
additional insured endorsement is not a contract of adhesion.
The second rationale for construing all insurance terms in favor of
coverage is that public policy warrants providing injured parties with an
adequate source of compensation.188 However, the additional insured general
contractor nearly always has his own general liability insurance that will cover
defense, judgment, and settlement costs.189 In many cases, because the general
contractor is a more economically powerful entity, his insurance actually will
be superior to his subcontractor’s and thereby will be an even larger source of
compensation for the injured victim. Therefore, in most cases, the rationale of
ensuring that the injured party will be fully compensated does not apply in the
additional insured context either.
B.

General Contractor Is Not a Party to the Contract

When interpreting the scope of additional insured coverage, the same
rights should not be afforded to additional insureds, who are not parties to the
original insurance contract, as those given to named insureds, who are parties
to the contract.190 First, the general contractor (the additional insured) is not a
party to the original contract between the subcontractor and his insurer and is
therefore not in the position to demand, as one of the contracting parties could,

186. Symington, 563 N.W.2d at 403.
187. Pomerantz, supra note 93, at 128-29.
188. Chrysler Corp. v. Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 796 A.2d 648, 652 (Del. 2002); Bosio v.
Branigar Org., 506 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Stickovich v. City of Cleveland, 757
N.E.2d 50, 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Pomerantz, supra note 93, at 128.
189. Am. Country Ins. v. Cline, 722 N.E.2d 755, 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Nelson, supra note
44, at 67; Oonk, supra note 12, at 12; Pomerantz, supra note 93, at 129; Richmond, Additional
Problems, supra note 32, at 964.
190. Pomerantz, supra note 93, at 126-27.
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that the contract be construed strictly against the other party.191 Second, the
general contractor is urging a construction of the contract that is detrimental to
both parties to the contract. It makes the insurance company liable for
damages for which its named insured may not be fully liable and payment
which could only result in higher insurance premiums for the named insured.
Therefore, the general contractor, who is not a party to the contract, is not in a
position to urge a construction of the contract which would be unfavorable to
both parties to the contract.192
C. Public Policy
The same public policy argument that is made for broad form indemnities
can also be made for additional insured agreements.193 A party who knows he
will not be financially responsible for any damages has little incentive to take
any preventative measures to ensure his negligence does not hurt a third
party.194 This lower degree of care, known as “moral hazard,” increases the
likelihood of a loss or injury to a third party.195 The possibility of moral
hazard should also be, but has rarely been, construed by the courts to restrict
additional insured endorsements.196 Consequently, even when the broad form
indemnity is declared unenforceable due to state law or otherwise, the
subcontractor, in a majority of jurisdictions, may still be forced to save and
hold harmless the general contractor if there is an additional insured
endorsement in place.197 For example, in McAbee Construction Co. v. Georgia
Kraft Co., the general contractor entered into a contract with the property
owner which obligated the general contractor to save and hold harmless the

191. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1262 (Ohio 2003); Cook v. Kozell, 199
N.E.2d 566, 569 (Ohio 1964).
192. Cook, 199 N.E.2d at 569.
193. Mehta, supra note 7, at 181.
194. Id. at 182. See also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
195. Mehta, supra note 7, at 182.
196. Id. at 183. The court in Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Zavarella Bros. Constr. Co., 699
N.E.2d 127, 130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997), did base its decision to void the additional insured
agreement on public policy grounds, as did the court in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv.,
Inc., 755 P.2d 52, 55 (N.M. 1988). Others have based their decisions on notions of common
sense and fairness. Courts are mindful that they should interpret statutes to achieve common
sense results and to avoid unreasonable or absurd results. Snell v. Engineered Sys. & Designs,
Inc., 669 A.2d 13, 20 (Del. 1995). To enforce an obligation to insure a party for its own
negligence is inconsistent with a void indemnity obligation and is to do indirectly what cannot be
done directly. See generally Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc., 578 A.2d 1202,
1209 (Md. 1990) (Eldridge, J., dissenting); Walsh Constr. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw, 76 P.3d 164
(Or. Ct. App. 2003); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Subcontractors Association at 10,
Chrysler Corp. v. Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 796 A.2d 648 (Del. 2002) (No. 38-2001).
197. Mehta, supra note 7, at 183-84. See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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owner from liability.198 The court properly held that this indemnity provision,
taken alone, would violate the Georgia law invalidating broad form
indemnities.199 The court went on to hold, however, that because the
contractor also added the owner as an additional insured, the owner had
effectively transferred the risk of loss, even that arising from his own
negligence, to the contractor.200 In doing so, the court made an unexplained
distinction between indemnification and additional insured status and did not
speak to how this “shifting the risk of loss” evaded the public policy arguments
that it had already agreed voided broad form indemnities.201
198. McAbee Construction Co. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 343 S.E.2d 513, 514 (Ga. Ct. App.
1986). The indemnity provision read:
The Contractor hereby assumes exclusive responsibility for all injury and/or damage to
any and all persons whomsoever and to any property whatsoever, and loss of use,
resulting from or arising out of the performance of the Work. The Contractor further
agrees to indemnify, hold harmless and defend the Owner against all claims, suits, losses,
damages and costs, including, but not limited to, court costs and reasonable attorney’s
fees, on account of such injury or damage, except when caused by the sole negligence of
the Owner. Provided, however, with respect to injury, including death, to any employees
of the Contractor or any Subcontractor, the Contractor agrees to indemnify, hold harmless
and defend the Owner from any claims, damages or suits filed against the Owner by any
employees of the Contractor and/or any employees of any Subcontractor, even though
such injury, including death, was caused by the sole negligence of the Owner.
Id.
199. Id. The Georgia statute invalidating broad form indemnities read:
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection with or collateral to
a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a
building structure, appurtenances, and appliances, including moving, demolition, and
excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify or hold harmless the promisee
against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property
caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees,
or indemnitee is against public policy and is void and unenforceable, provided that this
subsection shall not affect the validity of any insurance contract, workers’ compensation,
or agreement issued by an admitted insurer.
Ga. Code Ann. § 13-8-2 (b) (1982).
200. McAbee Constr. Co., 343 S.E.2d at 515.
201. Mehta, supra note 7, at 185. Many courts that have held similarly based their decisions
on the insurance “savings clause” that many states have enacted along with their statutes
invalidating broad form indemnities. A typical insurance savings clause in an anti-indemnity
statute reads, “Nothing in this section shall affect the validity of any insurance contract.” The
court reads the statute to disallow broad form indemnities but reads the savings clause to allow a
party to procure insurance for another’s sole negligence. Courts also contend that the policy
argument for allowing one to provide insurance for another’s sole negligence outweighs the
policy arguments against it. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Merrell & Garaguso, Inc., 796 A.2d 648,
652 (Del. 2002) (“From the viewpoint of the injured worker, the greater the amount of insurance
available to respond to his claim, the better the prospect for full compensation.”); Bosio v.
Branigar Org., 506 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“An agreement in a construction
contract requiring a contractor to provide insurance protecting the owner also protects the interest
of the construction worker and the general public by preserving a potential source of
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In the traditional liability insurance situation, moral hazard can be avoided
because the named insured will be charged higher premiums if he engages in
activities that bring about greater risk.202 Additionally, to provide incentive for
insureds to prevent loss, insurance companies may also reduce premiums if the
named insured takes certain steps to reduce the risk of loss.203 However, the
additional insured is shielded against these prospects because he is not
responsible for premium payments to the insurer and is unaffected by the
raising or lowering of premiums.204 Thus, an entity that is only paying a
predetermined amount of the subcontractor’s current insurance cost has no
incentive to act more responsibly.205
D. Why the Court’s Solution Will Not Work
1. No Bargaining Power
In most of these decisions, the courts suggest a solution: had the parties
intended for coverage for the sole negligence of the additional insured to be
excluded, language embodying that intent was available and should have been
used in the endorsement.206 However, this is much easier said than done. In
the negotiating process, subcontractors have little or no real bargaining power
over the general contractor.207 Huge corporations exert disproportionate
leverage over the contracting industry, and very few if any of these huge
corporations are subcontractors.208 Many general contractors refuse to allow
subcontractors to include limiting language in their additional insured
endorsements, as they want the broadest coverage possible. The general
contractor can easily turn to the numerous other subcontractors available

compensation for injured workers.”); Stickovich v. City of Cleveland, 757 N.E.2d 50, 59 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2001) (“In the context of insurance, one is more apt to encounter public-policy
arguments to require coverage or to override policy exclusions, rather than to invalidate coverage,
because the predominate social purpose of liability insurance is to compensate injured persons.”);
Brzeczek v. Standard Oil Co., 447 N.E.2d 760, 764 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (“Courts do not, as a
general matter, look unfavorably on agreements which, by requiring parties to carry insurance,
afford protection to the public.”).
202. Mehta, supra note 7, at 185.
203. Id. at 186.
204. Id. at 187.
205. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 8, Chrysler Corp. (No. 38-2001).
206. McIntosh v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 251, 255 (10th Cir. 1993); Pardee Constr. Co.
v. Ins. Co. of the West, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Acceptance Ins. Co. v.
Syufy Enter., 69 Cal. App. 4th 321, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); National Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park Dist., 632 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ill. 1994); Consol.
Edison Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 610 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
207. Walsh Constr. Co. v. Mut. of Enumclaw, 76 P.3d 164, 169 (Or. Ct. App. 2003);
Steckman & Cleary, supra note 97, at 83.
208. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 8, Chrysler Corp. (No. 38-2001).
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should one refuse to include the language he desires in the additional insured
endorsement. The reality is that in order to get scarce construction work, it
may be necessary to agree to additional insured status, and the stronger general
contractor usually is successful in obtaining the broad coverage he desires.209
2. Courts Will Find Coverage Illusory
Even if the subcontractor is successful in negotiating an additional insured
endorsement limiting coverage to vicarious liability, some courts will still go
out of their way to construe the language against the insurer. The words of
Chief Justice Bilandic’s dissent in National Union Fire Insurance Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park District represent the stance that
some courts take towards additional insured agreements limiting coverage to
vicarious liability; such coverage is illusory.210 He stated:
NDS [the contractor] is an independent contractor and the Glenview Park
District [the property owner] cannot be held vicariously liable for its
acts except under a narrow exception. Even if it was to be held
vicariously liable for the acts of NDS, the Glenview Park District
would have an action for indemnity against NDS and, therefore, would
have no need for vicarious liability coverage on the painting contract.
The endorsement is illusory and provides no coverage at all. [T]he
endorsement’s exclusion violates public policy and should not be
enforced.211

The majority in this case, while basing its decisions on other grounds, did
indicate that it would be willing to hear the argument that these types of
exclusions are illusory and thus always unenforceable.212
209. See Berardi v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 107 Misc. 2d 451, 463 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980);
Walsh Constr. Co., 76 P.3d at 169 (citing Audio Tape, House Committee on Commerce,
Subcommittee on Business, SB 788, Tape 33, Slide A, (May 11, 1995) [statement of
Representative Larry Wells]).
210. This argument has been made in several cases by general contractors seeking a
declaratory judgment that the subcontractor’s insurance has the duty to defend and indemnify him
for his own negligence, but as of yet has not been accepted by the courts. See, e.g., Liberty Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Statewide Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 2003); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.
of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. R. Olson Constr. Contractors, Inc., 769 N.E.2d 977, 985 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002); Am. Country Ins. Co. v. Kraemer Bros., Inc., 699 N.E.2d 1056 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999);
Am. Country Ins. Co. v. Cline, 722 N.E.2d 755, 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). The Liberty court even
noted “[The general contractor] has not convinced us there are indications the tide is turning in its
favor.” Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 352 F.3d at 1101. It still remains, however, a potentially
viable argument for the general contractor to make.
211. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park Dist., 632
N.E.2d 1039, 1046 (Ill. 1994) (Bilandic, C.J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 1043. This same concept is also discussed in Douglas Richmond’s article, The
Additional Problems of Additional Insureds. He states that public policy may actually strengthen
an argument for liability coverage for the additional insured’s sole negligence. See Richmond,
Additional Problems, supra note 32, at 964. See also Hendrick, supra note 34, at 625.
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3. Courts Will Ignore Exclusionary Language
In addition to holding additional insured endorsements limiting coverage to
vicarious liability illusory, courts may simply ignore clear exclusionary
language. Such was the case in Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass’n.213
The Idaho Supreme Court, although not relying on public policy, refused to
uphold a clear exclusion in the additional insured endorsement.214 In this case,
Bonner County was covered under an additional insured endorsement that
expressly and unambiguously excluded liability arising out of the County’s
sole negligence.215 The endorsement excluded “liability of the [additional
insured] arising out of [the additional insured’s] sole negligence.”216 In
addition to promising to procure insurance for the County, Panhandle Rodeo
Association (“Panhandle”) also agreed to hold the County harmless for any
liability incurred as a result of the rodeo performance.217 Despite the general
rule that courts must enforce a clear and unambiguous policy provision, the
Bonner Court went outside the policy and interpreted its terms together with
the underlying agreement between the County and Panhandle.218 Once it did
so, the exclusion of liability caused by the additional insured’s sole negligence
and the agreement to hold harmless for any liability incurred were at odds.
The court stated, “Accordingly, we find, under the facts before us, the
ambiguous circumstance in which a policy has been issued purportedly
providing coverage but with exclusionary provisions which, if applied, would
narrow that coverage to ‘defeat the very purpose or object of the
insurance.’”219 Consequently, the exclusion was not given effect, and
Panhandle’s insurer had a duty to defend the County on a claim indisputably
arising out of the County’s sole negligence.220
Another case similar to Bonner is Maryland Casualty Co. v. Nationwide
Insurance Co.221 Again, the unambiguous language of the endorsement at
issue in this case clearly limited coverage of the additional insured to instances
when the additional insured was held vicariously liable for acts of the named
insured.222 The court, notwithstanding the endorsement’s clear exclusions,
ruled that the subcontractor’s insurer owed a duty to defend the general

213. Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass’n, 620 P.2d 1102 (Idaho 1980).
214. Id. at 1106-07.
215. Id. at 1104.
216. Id. at 1104.
217. Id. at 1103.
218. Bonner County, 620 P.2d at 1106-07.
219. Id. at 1106.
220. Id. at 1106-07. In coming to this conclusion, the court disregarded the well established
principle that courts should not strain to create ambiguities in an insurance policy where none
exist. See Richmond & Black, supra note 95, at 807 n.236.
221. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
222. Id. at 28.
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contractor when the allegations of the complaint did not allege vicarious
liability.223 In this case, Nielsen Construction Company (“Nielsen”) served as
the general contractor of a construction project.224 Nielsen hired various
subcontractors, including West Coast Sheet Metal (“West Coast”) and R.W.
Strang Mechanical (“Strang”).225 The subcontractors’ agreements required the
subcontractors to obtain general liability coverage and name to Nielsen as an
additional insured.226 Nielsen was subsequently sued for various construction
defects and tendered his defense to Nationwide, the company insuring both
West Coast and Strang.227 The language of the endorsement read, “Who is an
insured is amended to include as an insured [Nielsen] but . . . this insurance . . .
applies only to the extent that [Nielsen] is held liable for [West Coast’s and
Strang’s] acts or omissions . . . .”228
The court acknowledged that this language did limit the scope of the
subcontractors’ indemnity obligations to situations where Nielsen would be
held vicariously liable for either West Coast’s or Strang’s actions.229 It went
on, however, to disregard all the limiting language in the endorsement and
stated that because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify,
Nationwide still owed a duty to defend Nielsen, even though Nielsen was fully
covered by his own insurance policy.230
4. Courts Will Strictly Construe the Limitation
In addition to finding endorsement language attempting to limit additional
insured coverage illusory or ignoring it completely, the court may strictly
construe any limitation in the endorsement. For example, if the complaint
alleges anything other than common law negligence, such as the violation of a
statute, the court may strictly construe the limitation to exclude only common
law negligence and to find any other cause of action covered. A case that
illustrates this point is National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park District.231 In this case, National Decorating
Service (“NDS”) and Glenview Park District (“Glenview”) entered into a
contract for NDS to paint portions of the Glenview Ice Center.232 NDS named
Glenview as an additional insured on its general liability policy issued by

223. Id. at 33-34.
224. Id. at 25.
225. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th at 25.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 28.
229. See id. at 31.
230. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th at 25, 31.
231. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park Dist., 632
N.E.2d 1039 (Ill. 1994).
232. Id. at 1040.
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National Union Fire Insurance Company (“National Union”).233
The
endorsement stated that it extended coverage to additional insureds “with
respect to operations performed by” the named insured.234 However, the
endorsement also contained a clause that excluded from coverage “damages
arising out of the negligence” of the additional insured.235
During NDS’s performance of its contract with Glenview, one of NDS’s
employees was injured after falling from a scaffold and filed suit against
Glenview for his injuries.236 The complaint alleged that Glenview was liable
under both the Structural Work Act and common law principles of
negligence.237 Glenview tendered its defense to National Union, who refused
coverage claiming the endorsement in NDS’s insurance policy excluded
coverage for damages arising from Glenview’s “negligence,” which would
include the claims for Structural Work Act violations and ordinary
negligence.238 The court disagreed and ordered National Union to defend
Glenview. The court stated:
[W]e find it significant that the explicit language of the endorsement
refers solely to “damages arising out of the negligence” of the
additional insured. In our view, this plain and unambiguous reference
to “negligence” in the exclusionary provision of the present insurance
policy is reasonably interpreted as a reference to the common law tort
of negligence. If National Union intended the term “negligence” to
include allegations that the additional insured had committed a
statutory tort, such as a violation of the Structural Work Act, it could
have easily modified its insurance policy to so provide.239

Having decided that National Union had a duty to defend Glenview on one
count, the court then relied on existing Illinois law that an insurer, faced with a
multi-count complaint only one count of which is covered, has an obligation to
provide a full defense for all counts, even those which are not covered.240 The
result in this case was that even after successfully negotiating contract terms
excluding coverage for the negligence of the additional insured, the named
insured’s carrier still had a duty to provide a full defense for claims resulting
from the negligence of the additional insured.

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1040-41.
Nat’l Union Fire Ins., 632 N.E. 2d at 1040.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1042 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1043.
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X. SOLUTION
A.

The Courts

Because of the courts’ expansive interpretation of additional insured
endorsements, the general contractor is essentially being handed coverage
under the subcontractor’s policy even for the consequences of his own
negligence, after the subcontractor’s work is finished and frequently
completely outside the subcontractor’s knowledge or power to control.241 The
preceding cases illustrate that the courts’ own suggestion to include limiting
language in the endorsements will not work in some cases. The courts have
consistently demonstrated their belief that these endorsements should be
construed as broadly as possible and will construe strictly or even ignore any
limiting language to find such coverage. Thus, it seems that the best solution
lies with the courts themselves.
The courts should follow the shrinking minority’s interpretation of
additional insured endorsements and allow coverage for vicarious liability
only. The allegations in the complaint must be within the scope of coverage
for imputed liability for the duties to defend or to indemnify to be triggered.
Restricting coverage to vicarious liability is not illusory. An illusory contract
is defined as an agreement in which one party gives as consideration a promise
that is so insubstantial as to impose no obligation.242 Such a limited
endorsement does impose an obligation on the named insured’s insurance
carrier: it must defend and indemnify the additional insured should he be
alleged or be found vicariously liable for an act or omission of the named
insured. Simply because there are fewer vicarious liability claims than
negligence claims does not make coverage illusory.243 The fact that the
subcontractor was only charged a minimal amount to add the general
contractor to his policy reflects the reality that only narrow exceptions should
be covered.244 If the general contractor wishes to have the subcontractor
procure coverage for all of his operations, he should pay more than a nominal
endorsement fee.245
The purpose of imposing liability on a party is not only to punish it for its
wrongdoing, but to force it to consider whether steps should be taken to
prevent a reoccurrence of the accident.246 Subcontractors are not in a position

241. See Hendrick, supra note 34, at 642; Cubbage, supra note 25, at 3; Brief of Amicus
Curiae American Subcontractors Association at 9, Chrysler Corp. v. Merrell & Garaguso, Inc.,
796 A.2d 648 (Del. 2002) (No. 38-2001).
242. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (7th ed. 1999).
243. Am. Country Ins. v. Kraemer Bros., Inc., 699 N.E.2d 1056, 1062 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
244. See Nelson, supra note 44, at 29.
245. Am. Country Ins. Co. v. Cline, 722 N.E.2d 755, 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
246. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1968).
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to prevent all workplace defects and accidents and thus should not bear all the
risk for them. They do not dictate the work sequence that creates the
conditions allowing many accidents to happen.247 Subcontractors do not
design buildings.248 They cannot always ensure that their work will
appropriately fit with work done by subsequent subcontractors, much less that
their work will not be damaged by a subsequent subcontractor in a rush.249
General contractors, on the other hand, are responsible for sequencing,
inspecting, and coordinating projects and otherwise bringing the entire job
together, so they cannot rationally evade all responsibility for worker injury
and defect claims.250 The general contractor, the party with the most authority
and power, is in the best position to prevent and to avoid mistakes.
Pushing all liability onto the subcontractor, which is precisely the result of
these expansive additional insured endorsement interpretations, is forcing the
least able party to bear the cost for another’s negligence and is encouraging no
one to take any steps to prevent future accidents. In the previously discussed
cases of Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Syufy Enterprises251 and Shell Oil v. AC
& S, Inc.,252 the additional insureds were undisputedly solely at fault, yet still
had to pay nothing. By using their superior bargaining power to push
insurance obligations down to weaker parties, the additional insureds have no
incentive to take any precautionary measures to prevent such accidents again.
For example, if the court in Shell Oil Co. would have read the Shell
endorsement to cover only situations where the owner was alleged to be
vicariously liable, the subcontractor’s insurer would not have become involved
in any way. Shell’s own insurance provider would have paid for its defense
and any judgments against it. This is a fair and logical result: Shell caused the
injury, Shell’s insurance pays, Shell’s insurance premium goes up, and now
Shell has incentive in the future to prevent such accidents. The subcontractor’s
insurance pays nothing, which is only reasonable as the subcontractor did
nothing wrong.
B.

The Parties

A simple solution to the additional insured situation seems to lie with the
subcontractors simply assuming greater insurance costs in their bids to the
general contractors. However, even if the subcontractor begins to assume
greater insurance costs in formulating his bids as his premium increases, the
247. Cubbage, supra note 25, at 3.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Syufy Enter., 69 Cal. App. 4th 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). For a
summary of the facts and holding of this case, see supra notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
252. Shell Oil v. AC & S, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). For a summary of the
facts and holding of this case, see supra notes 111-125 and accompanying text.
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general contractor is going to pass the subcontractor’s cost to the property
owner with a mark-up.253 If the general contractor can keep his own insurance
costs down by insisting on additional insured status and passing his risk
downstream, he will not care if the subcontractor has more cost because he
simply passes the cost up to the owner.254 Consequently, this issue is going to
resolve itself through negotiation only when enough subcontractors realize the
sizeable risk they are assuming and start to say, “NO.”255
In lieu of offering the general contactor additional insured status, a
promising alternative is to offer him an Owner-Contractor Protective (OCP)
policy.256 This policy has advantages for both the subcontractor and the
general contractor.257 From the general contractor’s perspective, it is
beneficial because he is not sharing the limits of the subcontractor’s policy
with the subcontractor and every other additional insured, rather he is covered
by a project-specific policy with separate limits.258 The subcontractor who
purchases the insurance receives no coverage under this policy (he is still
covered by his own general liability policy), so the general contractor has more
coverage for himself.259 Additionally, the general contractor is a directly
insured party, so the OCP carrier owes a duty to defend any claims
immediately and to satisfy any imposed liabilities that fall within the scope of
coverage.260
From the subcontractor’s perspective, OCP is beneficial because it does
not consume his own policy limits, and the loss experience is counted
separately from his own liability policy’s loss experience (i.e., his own policy
premium will not increase or be cancelled).261 Also, the negligence of the
insureds is excluded from coverage because the policy is limited to claims for
the named insured’s vicarious liability or claims based on supervisory
functions of the general contractor.262
Providing this OCP policy will force a subcontractor, before submitting a
bid to the general contractor, to price separately and to contemplate both the
risk it is agreeing to insure and what multiple of that risk should be included in
his bid to the general contractor.263 This system, which holds each individual

253. E-mail from Jack O’Neil, General Counsel, The Western Group, (Jan. 15, 2004) (on file
with author).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 646.
257. See id.
258. Cubbage, supra note 25, at 4.
259. Id.
260. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 646.
261. Id; Cubbage, supra note 25, at 4.
262. Hendrick, supra note 34, at 646; Cubbage, supra note 25, at 4.
263. Cubbage, supra note 25, at 4.
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insured financially responsible for his own behavior, would bring a reasonable
pricing model to the market for construction insurance and strengthen
incentives for construction participants to keep prices down by safeguarding
both workers and consumers.264
XI. CONCLUSION
The courts’ broad interpretation of additional insured endorsements are
conferring too much coverage on general contractors. The initial intent of
these endorsements was to give immediate and direct coverage to general
contractors in situations where the general contractor was held vicariously
liable for acts of his subcontractor. The low price charged for these
endorsements confirms this intent. However, courts have now begun to read
broadly these endorsements and confer coverage not only for vicarious
liability, but for the sole negligence of the general contractor as well. Courts
do not understand the unique status additional insureds hold and are therefore
interpreting these endorsements in the same manner they would in a dispute
over coverage for the named insured. These expansive readings have a
detrimental effect on subcontractors whose insurance is called on to defend.
However, the courts do not see this because the parties in front of them are not
normally the subcontractors, but two insurance companies litigating over who
should bear the financial liability. The subcontractor’s deductible is many
times maxed out, his premiums may go up, and his policy may be cancelled.
Additionally, no public policy argument can justify this broad interpretation.
The general contractor often has his own liability insurance coverage to pay
out any judgments, settlements, or defense costs he incurs. He is also, as an
additional insured, not entering into a contract of adhesion, thereby negating
the argument that any ambiguous terms should be interpreted in his favor.
Lastly, pushing this burden of covering the general contractor for the general
contractor’s sole negligence is making the subcontractor, who has no control
over the risk, responsible for suffering the financial loss. It is the
subcontractor, the least able to pay for the cost of this risk, who is left paying
for the negligent acts of others. Additional insured endorsements should be
read with the original intent in mind: vicarious liability only.
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